

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

*Memo
Chino*

TO:

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① DCI		X w/o att		
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6 DDA				
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11 IG				
12 Compt				
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Date

Remarks

D/ Executive Secretary

20 January 1984

Date

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Executive Registry


84 - 340

19 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Questions raised by Tom Latimer, HPSCI Staff

You better get me responses to the questions raised by
Latimer on the attack on the Marine Headquarters in Beirut as
reported on the second page of this memo [redacted]

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William J. Casey

Attachment:
DCI/ICS-84-3055

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DCI/ICS-84-3055
14 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence ✓
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: [REDACTED]
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: ~~Meetings with Directors of SSCI and HPSCI Staffs~~

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1. This week I met with Rob Simmons and Tom Latimer to invite them to a briefing that we would give at the IC Staff Headquarters Building in early February. We will highlight the key points of our FY 85 budget submission and talk to them about overall strategy with the upcoming hearings and elicit any questions or comments that the individual staff members might have.

2. Rob Simmons was most enthusiastic about the idea. He stated that he would ask all members of the SSCI Staff to attend and that he would make arrangements for such an overview briefing about one week after they had received the Congressional Budget Justification Books. He also indicated that the Chairman would be taking a very firm stand with the Armed Services Committee this year regarding the Authorization Bill; i.e., once they have decided on their markup, he intends to hold the line and not get into the kind of debate that we had last year. He stated that this was going to be a tougher year than the last couple because of congressional pressure to cut the defense budget, and therefore, the intelligence budget would be coming under a similar amount of scrutiny. He welcomed the idea of a budget strategy session with us prior to the beginning of the hearings.

3. The session with Tom Latimer was lengthier and dicier. After explaining that we would like to have the HPSCI Staff over for a budget overview, Latimer said fine, but that it would be difficult to get them all at once since many of them are on travel and that they hoped to begin the FOIA hearings in early February. I told him that we understood and would be glad to accommodate them in whatever manner; i.e., one, two, or three at a time, if this would be helpful to them. Latimer indicated that it would be most important to get Mike O'Neil on board and briefed since he is the staffer that the Chairman pays closest attention to. Latimer and I then discussed the following points.

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- This is going to be a hard year in Congress because of the congressional calendar (relatively short number of days that the Congress will be in session) and attempts by the House to trim the defense budget significantly; as with comments from Simmons, Latimer says that intelligence will be in for a tougher time accordingly.
- Since we have had several big increases over the past few years, it will be much harder to justify a large increase this year no matter what we may say.
- Both Grenada and Lebanon are considered by many members as intelligence failures. What Latimer pointed out as examples follows:
 - The failure of the 82nd Airborne to receive the intelligence that they needed; I countered that the intelligence was available to the 82nd and others, but the matter of dissemination of that information from the 18th Corps to 82nd and their units in the field was not the DCI's responsibility.
 - The information was available in Lebanon to give the Marines a complete heads-up, and it was not passed to Garrity; I countered that intelligence had been flowing into the Lebanon/Beirut area for weeks indicated the high possibilities of terrorist attacks, that the Marines had virtually every car bomb in the city targeted and that they had not expected a truck bomb--(we had no evidence of a truck bomb), and that you cannot blame intelligence on any lack of security to be taken around the Headquarters Compound in Beirut.
 - Latimer then remarked about the FBI report on the bombing of the embassy building in Beirut and that this information was not made available to the military and appeared to be a bureaucratic shuffle between CIA and FBI; I was unable to comment since I was not familiar with those details.
 - Latimer then spoke of the Long Report about lack of HUMINT in the area and that he had had the staff go back and dig up the record of the past several years to point out that HUMINT had in fact increased considerably within the NFIP during the past several years; I pointed out that even though the Congress has given us great support for rebuilding our HUMINT that

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it was one of our highest/Presidential priorities, and that as he well knows you cannot replace HUMINT over night. (Latimer then referred to his time when he was Exec to Jim Schlesinger, and it was necessary to "weed out the fat," but that there was still plenty of meat left on the bones.) I let the subject drop at that point.

- As a result of some of the kinds of remarks from Latimer above, he then stated that members would be asking hard questions along the lines of "what have you been doing with all those dollars we have been giving you for the last several years."
- Latimer then spoke of the need to get on with compliance problems. (I had the feeling that Eimer had perhaps been up talking to the Committee.) I pointed out to him that this was one of the DCI's high priorities, but that we were not going to sign up for any big bucks programs for verification or any other intelligence collections until it was well defined and appeared to be a viable program, that in this particular area we had a number of highly classified, compartmented efforts that were looking at the overall verification issue, but agreed that we still had a lot of work to do in this area.

4. As you can see, terrorism, Central America, and compliance verification are going to be big issues this year along with "our failures," and what we have been doing with all the money that the Congress has given us.

5. It is going to be an interesting year.

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